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The widespread concern about the declining state of our physical environment is often accompanied by frustration about what to do to prevent or even reverse such deterioration.
In the past, policy makers, legislators, and the general public have usually turned to scientists and scientific knowledge for answers. But recently, theorists and others have reemphasized the importance of culture in understanding the environment. In this article, this culturalist critique of scientific knowledge is discussed and is then related to the decision by Ontario Hydro to lay up seven of its nuclear reactors. This situation is used to illustrate the continuing relevance of scientific knowledge for addressing environmental concerns.
T he critical importance of culture for a proper understanding of our relationship with our environment has been reinvigorated recently by several theorists. One major focus of debate has been the neglect of cultural knowledge in favor of technical, scientific knowledge in the formation of environmental policy. Szerszynski (1996) and others (Goldblatt, 1996) have pithily summarized this as the issue of "knowing what to do." How do we know what we should do about environmental problems? What body of knowledge can we use to resolve our current dilemmas, and how do we know that this body of knowledge is better than others? In this article, I take up this issue and argue that scientific knowledge gets short shrift in most proposals, which call for a more culturally based understanding of the environment as a way to deal with environmental concerns.
This article begins with a brief overview of Ulrich Beck's (1992 Beck's ( , 1996 influential ideas about the "risk society" and then tackles the culturalist critique of science that is tied to his writings. The next section identifies problems with this culturalist solution and shows that science cannot be completely abandoned in environmental policy discussions. A third section develops an alternative proposal, building on recent developments in the sociology of science. A fourth section presents an illustration that shows that science remains important in environmental decision making and that it is neither necessarily undemocratic nor as monolithic as culturalist critics contend. The final section offers a concluding assessment of the continuing importance of science for understanding the environment. Specifically, the argu-ment is that trying to improve current environmental policies by calling on some body of cultural knowledge is not feasible and that we must instead recognize the diversity of what we call science and how it can help us understand our relationship with the environment.
RISK AND THE CULTURALIST
CRITIQUE OF SCIENCE Beck's (1992) pioneering work on the transition to the risk society is a major source of inspiration for the discussion of current environmental controversies (Goldblatt, 1996; Yearley, 1996) . His major point is that contemporary societies are best understood as risk societies, in which the distribution of the negative consequences of industrial production has replaced the distribution of its fruits as a fundamental organizing principle . 1 As Beck wrote, "In risk society, conflicts over the distribution of 'bads'produced by it are superimposed on the conflicts over the distribution of societal 'goods'" (Beck, 1996, p. 28) . Furthermore, "the entry into risk society occurs at the moment when hazards which are now decided and consequently produced by society undermine and/or cancel out the established safety systems of the provident state's existing risk calculations" (p. 31). In other words, the risk society materializes when we no longer have the ability to control the hazards we decide to produce, and the distribution of these hazards across the population becomes as much of an issue as the allocation of the benefits of industrialization.
Industrial societies produce risks-through instrumentally rational decisionsand in the process, they are transformed into risk societies in which the calculability of hazards using these same instrumentally rational principles becomes impossible. According to Beck, our current understanding of "the environmental crisis" is just as much if not more a product of our institutions than it is of "actual physical threats." Environmental problems are not ecological problems but reflections of institutional crises in industrial society and a sure sign that we have entered the era of risk.
The idea that environmental problems are reflections of socioinstitutional rather than biological difficulties represents a break with instrumentally rational understandings of the physical world. Indeed, Szerszynski, Lash, and Wynne (1996) and others argued that the modernist, scientistic understanding of the environment as a purely separate physical world is an integral part of current environmental problems and a barrier to real solutions for the future. This is why programs emanating from paradigms as diverse as neoclassical economics, the limits to growth and sustainable development are inadequate. Szerszynski et al. contended that First and probably most frequently expressed is the claim that scientific and industrial advances are responsible for many of the problems we now face. Preindustrial ecological catastrophes were usually more localized and often took much longer to manifest than many of the threats we face currently (Beck, 1992) . Nuclear meltdowns, global warming, and ozone depletion are all problems we would not face were it not for science. Moreover, their potential consequences are arguably more serious and widespread than nonscientific environmental threats. This is not to deny that science and industrialization have also produced many good benefits. Rather, the point is that science creates many problems, often unintentionally, so relying on it to solve environmental crises is wrongheaded (Beck, 1992; Harper, 1996) .
Second, it can and has been shown that relying on expert scientific advice has resulted in poor environmental decisions. Robin Grove-White (1996) , for example, discussed three interesting cases. In one instance, he showed how strict economistic models used to cost out the Sizewell nuclear plant in Britain underestimated the true cost by 50%. However, had the nonscientific models proposed by local environmentalists been used, the government would have had a much better estimate of the true cost of the plant, and it might have decided against building the facility. Novek and Kampen (1992) also revealed the serious flaws in the environmental impact assessments of pulp mills in northern Alberta. Indeed, there is no shortage of examples that show that relying on expert knowledge has produced undesirable policy outcomes.
A third argument raised against science as a basis for policy is the claim that science is rooted in an outdated, modernist conception of the world. Modernism is dead, so the argument goes, and we must jettison those things that rely on modernism for their vitality. The "myths of modernity" (Grove-White, 1996, p. 284)-a belief in the power of prediction and control and that individuals have control over their own destiny-can no longer be sustained. Science, based as it is on prediction and control, is also no longer tenable, and to continue to place faith in scientific knowledge is to cling to a potentially harmful illusion. The separation of the natural world from humanity, and the scientific and technical understanding of the world that supports this distinction, is the real source of the problem.
THE CULTURALIST ALTERNATIVE AND ITS PROBLEMS
This last objection to science, which resonates well with Beck's (1992) insistence on the social bases of the environmental crisis, is the most serious of the three. Most scientists and policy makers would agree that scientific knowledge has led to intentional and unintentional environmental problems. Moreover, they are also likely to agree that even when it has been used properly, it has occasionally resulted in destructive policies. However, many of them would likely still see a role for scientific and expert knowledge for understanding environmental problems.
But the third objection is a direct challenge to the role of science in this process. Many commentators argue that what we need is a more culturalist understanding of the environment to know "what we ought to do about the crisis" (Szerszynski, 1996, p. 104) . Although the specifics often differ, the general point is the same across much of this literature. That is, the modernist assumptions that underlie science and policy discourses must be abandoned before real progress can be made on environ-mental problems. This point is clearly stated in the Szerszynski quote above, but the general idea is also articulated by others.
For instance, Grove-White (1996) argued that the knowledge used by policymaking bodies in Britain is not sufficiently cultural in that it is exclusively scientific, rational, and individualistic (i.e., modernist). He contended that modernist, scientific knowledge should not be used as the basis for policy because it is too limited and undemocratic. It is limited because it is founded on the myths of modernity, and it is undemocratic because by claiming to provide the truth about the world, it effectively silences competing viewpoints and participants (see also McDonell, 1997; Mehta, 1997; Wynne, 1996b) . Instead, we need to pay attention to the specific cultural and relational knowledges of particular places and times to set us on the right path. Modernity and its myths must be replaced with knowledge "of what real people are like and what their relational and communal needs may be, in the circumstances of modern complex societies" (Grove-White, 1996, p. 283) . Furthermore, there is an urgent need for "pretensions, practices and methods radically different from those involved in the increasingly dominant quantitative sciences (natural and social)" (Grove-White, 1996, p. 284) . He claimed that a more culturalist approach has something important to offer in environmental decisions by highlighting those processes and knowledges that get ignored in most policy discussions. Cultural knowledge is simply not relevant to most policy makers, economists, and others who rely exclusively on modernist knowledge. But a qualitative, personalized, and attentive research strategy can provide greater opportunities for wider participation in the decision-making process (see also Mehta, 1997; Wynne, 1996a) .
Maarten Hajer (1995) stressed the undemocratic nature of expert scientific advice. He wrote,
The institutional practices of privileged expert advice have led to a negation of all sorts of critical capacities in society and have falsely resulted in a delegation of decision-making on some of the most important decisions to experts'councils that operate beyond the realm of democratic control. (p. 282) This echoes Beck's (1992) claim that "it is increasingly the case that experts rule, even where politicians are nominally in charge" (p. 35). Here, Beck is relying on Schelsky's point that "technical-scientific decisions cannot be subject to any democratic informed opinion" (p. 35). One solution to this problem of a lack of democracy is to open up the process of environmental policy making to allow for the participation of nonscientific ways of knowing. As Hajer argued, What is called for are institutional practices that allow for the playing off against one another of different sorts of knowledge. Rather than orienting ourselves on science as the universal discourse, one might choose to facilitate the institutionalization of a public language that would allow for productive interdiscursive debates. (p. 282) Although these solutions to the problems of environmental policy formation have some appeal, they suffer from three critical problems. First, it is never made clear in the culturalist critique which body of knowledge we should draw on to generate this new approach to the environment. If we are truly into the era of many cultures, which set of cultures do we draw on to inform our policies? Wynne (1996a) , Grove-White (1996) , and Yearley (1996) , among others, would seem to suggest 412 ORGANIZATION & ENVIRONMENT / December 2001 that we should look to the localized knowledges of people and groups before they come into contact with formal institutions. This has some affinities with projects for reclaiming a public space proposed by Habermas (1989) and others, and this may indeed prove to be a desirable strategy. However, a more complete delineation of where this alternative might come from and what it might look like seems in order.
Second, it seems only prudent to make sure that before we throw out a key component of the knowledge that has underpinned our approach to the environment, we will have some sort of replacement ready to fill in the gap. It would be desirable to have some assurance that if we proceed with this change, we will be better off in the long run. This view is clearly not shared by others, who claim, for instance, that "such [cultural] approaches offer no guarantees of grand solutions. But they are better than driving blind, at increasing speed-which is what we are being pressed to do even more" (Grove-White, 1996, p. 284) . This is hardly justification for the sort of upheaval being advocated. It is incumbent on the proponents of the culturalist view to provide a compelling argument about how this change will improve our lives.
Third and most important, replacing science with some body of cultural knowledge is impossible because science itself is fundamentally cultural. This is a basic insight of the social study of science, and Beck (1992) elaborated it clearly in his discussion of primary versus reflexive scientization. Wynne (1996a) developed this point about different types of knowledges by considering the distinction between scientific and lay knowledges. He pointed out that the distinction between lay and expert knowledges is inherently problematic because science is deeply cultural, both at the level of the laboratory and as a manifestation of the culture of modernism. As Wynne put it, Once one introduces the idea that scientific expert knowledge itself embodies a particular culture-that is, it disseminates and imposes particular and problematic normative versions of the human and the social-then this fundamental divide is no longer tenable. An important strand of sociological and historical work on science has problematised the supposition of an objective boundary between science and the public domain, as if for example knowledge and cognitive influence only flow one way, and as if there were not cultural, epistemic and cognitive commitments that were in principle open, but held in common and mutually reinforcing across the boundary. (1996a, p. 75) To replace science with something else, it would have to be surgically extracted from social life. But determining where science ends and something else begins is far from straightforward. Science and scientific knowledge are integral components of modern culture that cannot be removed without fundamental alterations to that culture.
THE ATTACK ON MODERNIST SCIENCE
But even if replacing science with some body of culturalist knowledge is impossible, many commentators continue to argue that science is a manifestation of modernism, and because of this, it is still problematic as an element of environmental policy. Science represents the epitome of modernist ideals, which are outdated or at least less relevant in the contemporary, postmodern age.
For instance, Wynne (1996a) argued that the debate about the divide between expert and cultural knowledge is no longer important, but the problem of the modArai / SCIENCE AND CULTURE 413 ernist roots of science and expert knowledge are still a barrier to adequate environmental policy. The cultural basis of science is now recognized, but the problem lies with the cultural values on which it is based. As Wynne and others saw it (Yearley, 1996) , science is based on certain modernist cultural norms, such as an interest in prediction and control, a notion of universal truth, and the elevation of scientific expertise above other forms of knowledge. 2 The central problem that these modernist notions and, in particular, the values of prediction and control pose for informing policy are that they are unachievable. Just like the quest for a singular objective truth, it is impossible to control or predict occurrences. As Szerszynski et al. (1996) argued, Perhaps because the world has become more complex and unpredictable than it was, or perhaps simply because it has always been more complex and unpredictable than we thought, the social-and natural-sciences need to move away from an orientation to the future based on naively modernist ideas of prediction and control. (p. 10) They continued by saying that the future is not a pre-existing land towards which we are all moving. . . . a simultaneous recognition of the intrinsic indeterminacy of the future, and of all our roles in shaping that future, impose on us all the duty to take responsibility for the future that we are creating. (p. 10) This second quote raises an interesting contradiction in the attack on modernist science. In the first quote above, we are being asked to throw over prediction and control as bases for science and policy, whereas in the second quote we are being asked to take responsibility for the future. Yet in any reasonable sense of the word, responsibility implies at least some degree of control. To take responsibility for the future, we must have some degree of control over it or at least think that we have some control over it.
Attempts to predict and control the future, in an inclusive sense, are not strictly tied to the development of modernism or to science. They can be pushed back at least as far as the transition from hunting and gathering to agricultural societies. In other words, there are many nonscientific and nonrational versions of these ideas (see also Wynne, 1996b) . Moreover, regardless of whether they are based on science, policies are fundamentally attempts to control or at least alter behavior. Yet it is not ever made clear how we would take this responsibility without concerning ourselves, at least in some fashion, with trying to predict and/or control what the future holds for us. A policy that does not exert control is simply not a policy. If we are to give up on prediction and control, then we must also give up on policy, not just science.
A second problem with the critique of modernist science as a basis for decision making in the environmental state is that the critique is based on a very traditional view of science. For instance, Hajer (1995) complained of the undemocratic nature of science, whereas Grove-White (1996) was concerned about its lack of attention to people's lived experience. These are features of Beck's (1992) primary scientization rather than reflexive scientization. But as Beck said, primary scientization "can only be observed in marginal areas of modernization, if at all" (p. 158). This is surprising, because many of the critics of modernist science are well steeped in and have made contributions to the social scientific study of science.
CONTROVERSY AND MULTIVALENCY IN THE SOCIAL STUDY OF SCIENCE
For the purposes of this article, there have been two important developments recently in the social study of science. First, there has been a sense of frustration about controversy studies continuing to remain a central focus of the field. Second, the multivalent nature of science has recently been emphasized.
Several commentators have expressed frustration at the continuing interest in scientific controversies as the focus of analysis in social studies of science. According to some observers, we already have a good understanding of the dynamics of scientific controversies and how one side or point of view comes to dominate another. Collins (1996) and others (Brante, Fuller, & Lynch, 1993) were exasperated about the endless stream of "controversy studies" that largely redocument well-worn ideas, regardless of whether the controversy under consideration is old or new.
The assumption in the past has been that once the debate is resolved, all of the sociologically interesting material has disappeared. But there are good reasons for studying cases in which there is no controversy, little controversy, or the controversy has been resolved without focussing simply on how that resolution came about. In other words, studying instances of resolved conflicts or decisions can be illuminating as well (see Collins, 2000 , for a discussion of what happens to "rejected sciences").
The point of studying agreements is not to be able to say, "See, science was right all along." There are, of course, numerous problems with this response, but I will touch on only three of them. First, even the most hard-nosed scientists would agree that science cannot lead to unequivocal policy directives (the "is-ought" or "factvalue" distinction), so the connection between scientific knowledge and a course of action remains unclear. An additional problem with this argument-and with those that merely demonstrate a case in which science has gone wrong (Grove-White, 1996)-is that the validity and usefulness of science becomes nothing more than a numbers game. It is useful if we can muster more examples in which science has been right than where it has been wrong, and it is not useful if the opposite is true.
Third, science is often deployed by participants on all sides of a debate, particularly in the arena of environmental policy. So science is often both right and wrong in these disputes before a consensus is reached. And as Wynne (1996b) and Fujimura (1998) showed, the sides in any dispute are not nearly as homogeneous as they are made out to be, either by the participants or by researchers.
A second development, articulated most clearly by Van der Sluijs, Van Eijndhoven, Shackley, and Wynne (1998) , is that science is multivalent. It is not the unitary body of ideas and practices that it is often made out to be, either by its adherents or its critics (Collins, 2000; Fujimura, 1998) . Rather, not all scientists use the same approaches, methods, theories, or assumptions. This point has not received much attention in the past, partly because the social study of science has been so dominated by controversy studies (Collins, 2000; Fujimura, 1998) . Studying controversies has led to a focus on how one vision of science wins a battle against other visions. In contrast, studying agreements, particularly real-world agreements and not those internal to a specific scientific discipline, can reveal how the many different visions of science come together on a position.
One implication of this point is that science need not be modernist or committed to any singular value (such as universal truth or a common method) but can be composed of numerous approaches and insights (see also Williams, 2000) . Conceived Arai / SCIENCE AND CULTURE 415 in this way, the attack on modernist science becomes irrelevant. Thinking of science as a nonunified set of practices is a more accurate reflection of the actual conduct of science in its many different forms (Beck, 1992; Fuller, 1993 Fuller, , 1999 Latour & Woolgar, 1979) .
The very term science and all of the understandings this implies may be useful in promoting understanding among groups (Yearley, 1996) . That is, science comes in many different forms, but the common name may induce groups to attempt to understand one another. It may provide an opportunity for cross-cultural communication and tolerance between different scientific communities and between scientific communities and those that use the results of science (such as social movements, politicians, and policy makers). As Calhoun (1995) showed, to understand a culture without evaluating it from within another culture necessarily implies a transformation in knowledge. This transformation is viewed as a progressive step to the extent that it leads to deeper understanding. Potentially, this transformation will lead to a greater tolerance of different positions on an environmental issue. To borrow Calhoun's (1995) example, once we understand both rugby and football, it may be possible to continue to play both games without falling into evaluating one from the standpoint of the other. The ability to dismiss others as fraudulent or to ignore them completely is greatly reduced. Similarly, once we understand different versions of science, we may be more accepting of the claims put forward by all scientists, which could have the potential to extend democratic participation in environmental decision making rather than reducing it. Of course, different visions of science may lead in the opposite direction, toward boundary work and attempts to declare other forms of knowledge as "not science" with all of the loss of prestige that this entails (Collins, 2000) . But boundary work is not inevitable, so it becomes an empirical question whether science still has a place in environmental decision making and how science reduces or increases participation in these decisions. Williams (2000) hoped that different groups involved in environmental conflicts and management possess a genuine desire to listen to and understand the points of view of other participants. This opens up the possibility that science can have a democratizing effect on environmental decision making rather than being fundamentally undemocratic.
In addition, science may resonate well with public understandings of the way in which decisions about the environment should be made. Dunlap (1998) and others have shown that lay public understandings of science and scientific concepts is low, but this does not preclude a belief in the utility of science, at least as one important component of knowing what to do about the environment. Indeed, Cohen (1998) suggested that respect for science among the general public is an important cultural prerequisite for countries wishing to pursue paths of ecological modernization. Similarly, Kraft (2000) and Johnson and Scicchitano (2000) argued that science is an important component of public participation in efforts to move toward sustainability. And public participation is often viewed as a crucial element not only in developing acceptable policies to deal with environmental problems but also in reducing past levels of mistrust about previous environmental policies (Halfacre, Matheny, & Rosenbaum, 2000) .
REACTOR LAYUPS AT ONTARIO HYDRO
The situation chosen to illustrate these issues is the inquiry into Ontario Hydro's decision in August 1997 to lay up 7 of its 20 nuclear reactors and to close permanently its heavy water plant at the Bruce nuclear station in Ontario, Canada. Ontario
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Hydro, which has recently been partially privatized and changed its name, continues to operate 12 nuclear reactors at three sites, 4 reactors at the Bruce Station on the eastern shore of Lake Huron, and 4 each at the Darlington and Pickering stations on Lake Ontario, just east of Toronto. This is the largest "voluntary" reduction in nuclear generating capacity in the world. The shutdown came in response to an independent consultant's report that claimed that the safety of these reactors was "minimally acceptable" (Ontario Hydro Nuclear Performance Advisory Group [NPAG], 1997, p. 3).The closure generated a great deal of media coverage and fueled public concerns about such things as privatization of Ontario Hydro, the cost of electricity, and the safety of the plants and the reactors that remain in service. The viability of alternative power sources, such as wind, solar, and cogeneration, and the economic impact of the closures on the surrounding communities also received attention ("Hydro Shock," 1997, p. A17) .
Environmental groups hailed the closure as a very positive move. Dave Martin of the nuclear watchdog group Nuclear Awareness Project said that the decision was a "victory for the people of Ontario and the environment" ("Hydro Shock," 1997, p. A17). He and other environmentalists also believed that even though the layups were officially temporary, these reactors have effectively been closed permanently because virtually all other reactors that have been laid up around the world have never reopened. 4 And the longer a reactor is out of service, the more expensive it is to restart.
Although media accounts of the decision characterized it as a surprise, there were numerous stories and editorials about problems at both the Pickering and Bruce plants in the months leading up to the announcement. Stories about the unusually short renewal of Hydro's license to operate the Pickering plant, heavy water leaks and heavy metal discharges, and cracks in steam lines at the Bruce station and even some of the preliminary reports leading up to the final review were reported in several major Canadian newspapers.
The decision to lay up the reactors created enough of a controversy that the provincial government established the Select Committee on Ontario Hydro Nuclear Affairs. Executives from Hydro, politicians, environmental groups, and concerned individuals and associations appeared before this committee to offer their views of the problems at Ontario Hydro. The official records of these committee hearings plus material from the groups involved in the hearings form the primary data source for this article.
At the committee hearings, the decision to lay up the reactors received scrutiny from panel members in an attempt to determine "what went wrong" (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 1997, September 30). There was little stated opposition to the decision from groups and individuals appearing before the committee, with the exception of the Power Workers Union. Instead, officials from Ontario Hydro, the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), and community and environmental groups again publicly endorsed the shutdown decision. These groups invariably appealed to some version of science to justify their support for the decision.
Interestingly, the major reasons given by the various groups for supporting the decision are not what might be expected. Environmental groups such as Nuclear Awareness Project and EnergyProbe stressed the economic sensibility of the layup and paid less attention to safety issues. These groups have "scientifically" documented safety problems extensively over many years. To many of them, the safety problems are so obvious that they do not require reiteration. Rather, these groups chose to focus on showing that nuclear power is very expensive, using the standard theories and procedures of economics.
In contrast, Ontario Hydro and AECB officials emphasized the potential safety problems in the future as the major reasons for the shutdown, virtually ignoring economic concerns. They relied on the management science of an internal report to close the reactors to preserve the safety of the plants. Ontario Hydro executives had drawn up business plans, again according to standard economic dictums, that show that nuclear power is a cost-effective generation strategy. They also pointed out that the plants are engineered in such a way that they are completely safe. In other words, virtually all groups in this process pointed to a scientific basis for their claims.
The board of directors of Ontario Hydro was the official body that ultimately made the decision to lay up the seven reactors, although it did so primarily on the advice of an Independent, Internal Performance Assessment (IIPA) report, prepared by a team of "nuclear experts" headed by Carl Andognini. Andognini had been brought in specifically by the president and CEO of Ontario Hydro to perform a "brutally honest" (Ontario Hydro NPAG, 1997, p. 2) appraisal of the state of Ontario Hydro's nuclear division. He brought with him a large team of experts, and they spent several months reviewing all of the operations of Ontario Hydro Nuclear using standard management science procedures such as "the IPAP methodology developed by the USNRC (Inspection Procedure No. 93808)" (Ontario Hydro NPAG, 1997, p. 3). Some components of the assessment, such as the engineering, radiation protection, and chemistry of the plants and reactors drew heavily on the disciplines of physics, chemistry, and engineering, whereas other areas such as organizational effectiveness and operations were assessed using the principles of economics, business, and management science.
The report stated specifically that all of the reactors run by Ontario Hydro were currently safe. However, there were significant problems looming on the horizon if changes were not made to the structure and operation of the plants. For Andognini and his team, the difficulties were related more to personnel and management rather than physical deficiencies with the reactors. The team found evidence of, among other things, alcohol and drug use by employees on the job, contradictory and counterproductive management structures, major communication gaps, and a lack of leadership at all levels of the nuclear division. These problems stemmed from the "nuclear cult" (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 1997, October 8) and its culture of invincibility, which had allegedly allowed monitoring and safety checks to deteriorate significantly.
5 Andognini claimed that if these problems were not addressed immediately, they could soon jeopardize the safety of the plants.
In explaining the report and subsequent layup decision to the Select Committee, Ontario Hydro chairman Bill Farlinger made it clear that the board had to understand the technical basis of the decision as well as the subsequent recovery plan. This included a series of events that had taken place within the past couple of years, such as short-term shutdowns of several reactors because of safety problems, an unusually short license renewal for the Pickering station, and the fact that none of the plants had met its performance targets and all were operating at 60% capacity in 1996/1997. But the most important problem, according to Farlinger, was the extremely poor management practices that had plagued Ontario Hydro for years and that now threatened to compromise the safety of the reactors if drastic action was not taken. Based on these problems and the advice of "nuclear experts" (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 1997, October 6), the board made the layup decision. When questioned on the matter by the committee, Farlinger repeated the technical and scientific underpinnings of the decision (Legislative Assembly Ontario, 1997).
Andognini, when questioned by the committee, repeated many of the same points raised by Farlinger about the safety of the reactors being potentially compromised by poor management structures and practices. In other words, management science had allowed Andognini and his team to identify problems that had the potential to create serious nuclear safety problems.
The AECB, which is the federal regulator of all nuclear activities in Canada, did not disagree with the layup decision. Committee testimony by its president and director general of reactor regulation reiterated that the reactors were currently safe to operate but that there were serious problems in all of the plants, which required attention. Moreover, these were problems that had been repeatedly identified by the AECB as early as 1986, and despite promises of corrective action by Ontario Hydro, the problems had never been fixed. The president of the AECB also stated repeatedly that although they set, license, monitor, and enforce safety standards for nuclear reactors, it is up to the licensee as to how it will actually meet these requirements. As such, the AECB was not prepared to comment on the suitability of the layup decision, only that it was not inconsistent with necessary improvements to performance. The AECB's concern and its mandate is to ensure that the reactors are operated according to "accepted standards related to nuclear safety" (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 1997, October 7). However, the AECB did point out that not all of the problems were management based but that there were significant engineering problems that needed to be resolved as well.
Testimony from environmental groups to the Select Committee tended to downplay the safety concerns of the reactors in favor of economic problems. This is not to say that they ignored safety problems, and certainly many of the groups owe their existence to public concern about the safety of nuclear power generation. However, many of these groups, especially the older groups such as EnergyProbe, have fought political battles over the safety of reactors in the past without much success. They appeared to be trying a new tactic and a new science to make their arguments. For example, of the five recommendations that EnergyProbe made to the Select Committee, four dealt strictly with economic concerns, such as the costs of nuclear power and the costs of the nuclear recovery plan proposed by Ontario Hydro (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 1997, October 20) . And although they agreed with Ontario Hydro that the layup decision was precipitated by bad management, they do not think that improved management alone will fix the problems that have led to taking the seven reactors off line. As Norm Rubin, director of nuclear research for EnergyProbe, told the Select Committee, More ominously still, Hydro is still applying wishful thinking in nuclear safety. Throughout the IIPA report, despite its rather honest and brutal examination of Hydro's failings, there is a laboured attempt to convince the reader that the Candu reactor is an inherently safe, forgiving piece of technology. It is not. (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 1997, October 20) EnergyProbe and other environmental groups believed that the layup decision was the correct decision for both economic and public safety reasons, and they wished to impress on the Select Committee the importance of not restarting the reactors. To them, this would be bad for the economy of Ontario and the safety of its citizens.
In contrast, one of the few groups to oppose the layup decision was the Power Workers Union. This union represents most of the people who run the reactors as well as workers in fossil fuel and hydraulic generation plants. The Power Workers Arai / SCIENCE AND CULTURE 419 Union has presented the Select Committee with a different recovery plan than the one outlined by Andognini, based on the economic sense of restarting the reactors, rather than writing them off. The Society of Ontario Hydro Professional and Administrative Employees, which represents all of the scientists, accountants, engineers, economists, and other researchers who work for Hydro, fully endorsed Ontario Hydro's plan to restart the reactors, and if anything, it wanted them restarted more quickly than Hydro proposed. Again, this group appealed to the economics of this position, and it almost took for granted that the reactors are or will be made safe. As the president of the society said,
The only way to limit greenhouse gas economically is through nuclear recovery. Using gas to generate electricity will increase our greenhouse gas problems. In addition, nuclear recovery provides Hydro with a competitive edge. With nuclear as part of the generation mix, Hydro can be the lowest-cost generator at the margin, as shown by a Resource Data International study of 32 utilities across the northeastern part of North America. Without nuclear generation, Hydro cannot be competitive. (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 1997, October 21) Many community groups, especially those in areas affected by the shutdowns, also side with Ontario Hydro about restarting the reactors. These groups are careful to agree with Ontario Hydro that the reactors are currently safe and that nuclear generation is an inherently safe technology, so the key question must then be the economic importance of the nuclear plants, especially to their regional economies. As the reeve of a township near one of the plants where four reactors were laid up told the committee, We believe there is little argument that the province needs electricity to function efficiently. Locally, we believe nuclear power is a proven, reliable source which has many environmental advantages over fossil fuel sources, and there are limits to other sources of electricity. The Bruce nuclear power development has a huge, local economic impact. . . . Due to the larger, relative impacts to Bruce county than in other areas, consideration should be given to bringing Bruce A back into operation sooner than the other nuclear plants. (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 1997, October 29) Some other groups and local politicians are asking the province for more money to shore up emergency infrastructures in case a nuclear accident did happen, whereas others are lobbying for environmental impact assessments and other assurances of safety before restarting the reactors is even considered.
What this example shows is that science is not a body of knowledge that operates just in the official domain. Anyone who is familiar with its workings can use it to act. Indeed, it is a crucial component of the action of environmental groups, community groups, and unions, most of which are outside of official state bodies. Despite the fact that Wynne (1996a) and others claimed that environmentalism has lost its true cultural critique of modernism by adopting the trappings of science, it is nonetheless used extensively by environmental groups, often unapologetically. As one environmentalist in this dispute put it, "To give a credible critique, you need science." This individual and the group he belongs to have done extensive work to figure out the physics and engineering of Candu reactors and to communicate this with their members and the public. This reinforces the point that internal critiques can be more effective than external ones and that at least some environmentalists have made the attempt to understand the science of nuclear reactors.
It might be argued that all this shows is that groups can use science to promote their own interests. Although there may be some merit to this objection, it does not diminish the point that science is not a fundamentally undemocratic form of knowledge. Each group, from the most powerful political and organizational officials to the most loosely organized individuals and movements, drew on an eclectic mix of scientific concepts, theories, and traditions to participate in an important forum of the environmental state. It was not just experts who used science as an avenue of participation, as Beck (1992) has suggested. It was used just as much by laypeople and arguably just as effectively. The lack of boundary work among all participants in the hearings made science a useful resource for many groups who might not normally be able to participate in these forums. Dismissing science as merely a tool in interest group politics misses these points entirely.
CONCLUSION
Science in the above illustration came in many different guises. Environmental groups relied primarily on economics to justify their support for the shutdown decision, whereas Ontario Hydro was prompted into the decision by the results of management science. The AECB drew more on engineering problems in evaluating the decision, and the Power Workers Union used economics to argue that the decision was wrong. In addition, the sciences of risk assessment, engineering, chemistry, and epidemiology were drawn on to lesser extents by various community groups, often in many different ways, in support of the decision.
Because science is multifaceted, it can be used to achieve or at least justify widespread agreements. However, these agreements and policy decisions need not be made by bodies that include all parties. Ontario Hydro made its decision independently, and it just happened to agree with the AECB, most politicians, and environmentalists. That is, agreement is not something that must be the product of controversy. It can arise unilaterally. It is clear that Ontario Hydro did not make this decision because it suddenly became less powerful than the environmentalists. This decision was made for other reasons that may or may not be discernible to outsiders.
Science was also employed in the disagreements on all sides of the eventual consensus. The reasons for supporting the decision were always scientific, even though different groups pulled from different versions of science. Also, the proposal to reopen the reactors is and will be hotly contested, again by drawing on numerous visions of science. So a multidimensional image of science can make even thin agreements possible.
Interestingly, the amount of boundary work by proponents of different versions of science was muted. Although the arenas of the Select Committee meetings and the mass media may not have been the most likely venues for these discussions, several environmentalists noted that they rarely encountered direct challenges to the legitimacy of their scientific claims from either Ontario Hydro or the AECB. There were challenges to interpretations and questions about methodology and procedures from all sides, but there was no evidence of any challenges in principle to an economic view or an epidemiological view of the situation, for example. Rather than trying to refute the scientific status of a particular argument, most participants simply ignored competing claims. This is interesting, given that Dunlap (1998) has shown that the general public is often not well-informed about the scientific details of environmental problems. In this case, at least, there was very little effort made to examine the scientific credibility of other participants in the process.
Arai / SCIENCE AND CULTURE 421 Instead, science allowed many different groups to participate in the Select Committee hearings and to present their arguments in such a way that they were treated as legitimate by the committee. In other words, there was no evidence to suggest that science was used to stifle democratic participation in a state-sanctioned forum for making decisions about the environment. Indeed, if anything, science allowed for greater participation in this situation because different groups were able to pull from different visions of science to make their points. Science, then, is not necessarily undemocratic, nor is it as integrated and coherent as is often assumed.
So science does not need to be chucked out of the environmental state, as has been advocated by several critics. A multidimensional understanding of science is a better reflection of the state of affairs surrounding the above decision and can be useful in arriving at widely accepted interpretations of environmentally consequential events. It can help us exert some degree of control and responsibility over the future. This is not to say that all environmental decisions must be based solely on science, however diverse it may be, or that all groups who act in and on the decisionmaking structures of the environmental state should translate their objectives into scientific jargon. Science is not the only useful tool in this process. But science should also not be abandoned, because it can be effective for some groups, on some issues, at particular times. Science is not the monolithic entity that many of its critics make it out to be, and it can be employed in many different ways for many different purposes. One of those purposes is coming to some level of agreement about what we can do about specific environmental problems.
NOTES
